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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background and Objective of the Study 
 
Korea has achieved rapid economic growth and social development in the 
last five decades and has become one of the world’s industrialized high-
income countries after evolving from a poor agrarian nation.  Korea’s success 
in combining economic growth and egalitarianism is paralleled by few other 
countries.  Korea is often commended for its exceptional success in achieving 
‘growth with equity’ or ‘shared growth’ (OECD, 2011).  Its per capita GDP 
has increased about 22 times from US$103.9 in 1962 to US$22,590 in 2012, 
and its per capita GDP in purchasing power parity increased to 30,722 dollars 
in 2012.  Gini coefficients have shown relatively equal income distribution 
and there was no significant change in its size during the period of 1965-
1993.  Korea’s Human Development Index (HDI) under the UNDP stood at 
15 out of 187 countries in 2011 with its life expectancy rising from 52.4 
years in 1962 to 80.8 in 2010.  Its political structure also changed from an 
authoritarian one to a fully functioning democracy, so both industrialization 
and democratization were realized in Korea within half a century.  
However, after a long period of rapid economic growth, Korea ran into 
serious economic difficulties in the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  The Korean 
government implemented drastic reforms to correct the structural weakness 
inherent in the economy.  As a result of the economic reforms of the 
corporate, financial, and public sectors and the labor market, the Korean 
economy strengthened global competitiveness.  Economic and social 
inequality and polarization have widened since 1998.  Therefore, Korea faces 
two intertwined fundamental challenges: First, Korea has to sustain economic 
growth in the face of a rapidly aging population and lowering potential 
growth rate.  Second, Korea has to achieve social cohesion by ameliorating 
inequality, bipolarization, and disparity in economic and social areas.  
The Asian Development Bank identifies inclusive growth as its first 
development agenda, with environmentally sustainable growth and regional 
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integration as its long term strategic framework for 2008-2020 (ADB, 2012).  
ADB details two key dimensions of inclusive growth: (i) achieving 
sustainable growth that will create and expand economic opportunities, and 
(ii) ensuring broader access to these opportunities so that members of society 
can participate in and benefit from growth.  
Inclusive growth is also one of three growth dimensions of the ‘Europe 
2020’, accompanying smart and sustainable growth (European Commission 
Communication, 2010).  The European Commission defines inclusive growth 
as fostering a high employment economy delivering economic, social, and 
territorial cohesion.  More concretely, it means (a) raising Europe’s 
employment rates — more and better jobs, especially for women, young 
people, and old workers, (b) helping people of all ages anticipate and manage 
changes through investment in skills and training, (c) modernizing labor 
markets and welfare systems, and (d) ensuring that the benefits of growth 
reach all parts of the EU.  EU’s targets for inclusive growth include (i) 75% 
employment rate for women and men aged 20-64 by 2020, (ii) better 
educational attainment: reducing school drop-out rates below 10%, (iii) at 
least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion.
1)
   
Against the backdrop of Korea’s current socio-economic challenges and 
inclusive growth definitions and indicators, this study aims to suggest policy 
implications for inclusive growth in the Korean economy.  For this purpose, 
after defining the inclusive growth of various organizations, Korea’s 
inclusive growth achievements and problems during the past decades will be 
analyzed based on inclusive growth indicators in section 2.  In section 3, 
Policy implications for the inclusive growth of Korea will be suggested.  The 
paper concludes in section 4. 
 
1.2. Definition of Inclusive Growth 
 
Even though there is no agreed upon definition of inclusive growth, the 
concept is understood to refer to ‘growth coupled with equal opportunities’.  
                                                     
1) http://ec.europe.eu.europe2020/priorities/inclusive-growth/index_en.htm.  
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It focuses on creating opportunities and making these accessible to all, not 
just the poor.  There is inclusive growth when all members of a society 
participate in and contribute to a growth process equally regardless of their 
individual circumstances.  In the same way, inclusive growth is one which 
emphasizes that economic opportunities created by growth are available to 
all, particularly the poor to the maximum possible extent (Kanbur and 
Rauniyar, 2010). 
The ADB’s inclusive agenda can be interpreted narrowly or broadly.  The 
narrow interpretation implies a focus on economic growth and broader 
participation in the process and outcomes, within which expanding human 
capacities is regarded as instrumental to improving economic outcomes.  A 
broad interpretation highlights inclusive development.  This approach 
emphasizes non-income measure of well-being and valuing human 
capabilities, such as good health and literacy, primarily as human 
development outcome. 
The International Policy Centre for the Inclusive Growth of the United 
Nations Development Program (IPC-IG/UNDP)’s work on inclusive growth 
starts from the premise that societies based on equality tend to perform better 
in terms of development.  Inclusive growth is both an outcome and a process. 
On the one hand, it ensures that everyone can participate in the growth 
process, both in terms of decision-making for organizing the growth 
procession as well as in participating in the growth itself.  On the other hand, 
it ensures that everyone shares equitably the benefits of growth.  Inclusive 
growth implies participation and benefit-sharing.  Without benefit, sharing 
will make growth unjust, and sharing benefits without participation in growth 
will make it a welfare outcome.
2)
  The IPC-IG sets (a) social protection and 
promotion, (b) productive inclusion and generation of opportunities, and (c) 
territorial development and systemic competitiveness as three pillars of 
inclusive growth (UNDP, 2010).    
Inclusive growth is different from the OECD-DAC’s ‘pro-poor growth’ in 
                                                     
2) “What is Inclusive Growth?,” International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth (www.ipc-
undp.org). 
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the sense that it allows for growth to be pro-poor if the poor are important 
beneficiaries of growth even if they are not active participants.  Also, the pro-
poor growth approach explicitly considers poverty a multidimensional 
phenomenon.  Therefore, the impact of growth on non-income dimensions of 
poverty is important, not only to the extent that they affect growth but also to 
the extent they affect the well-being of the poor (Klasen, 2010). 
We put emphasis on productive employment as an important element of 
inclusive growth.  Sustained, high growth rates and poverty reduction can be 
realized only when the sources of growth are expanding.  Increasing the 
share of the labor force is included in the growth process in an efficient way.  
Inclusive growth is about raising the pace of growth and enlarging the size of 
the economy, while leveling the playing field for investment and increasing 
productive employment opportunities.  Hence the focus is not only on 
employment growth but also on productivity growth.  The equality of 
opportunity in terms of access to markets, resources, and unbiased regulatory 
environment for business and individuals is important.     
The inclusive growth approach takes a long term perspective as the focus 
on productive employment rather than direct income distribution as a means 
of increasing income for excluded groups.  The inclusive growth analysis 
focuses on ways to raise the pace of growth by utilizing more fully parts of 
the labor force trapped in low-productivity activities or completely excluded 
from the growth process.  The main instrument for a sustainable and 
inclusive growth is assumed to be productive employment (Ianchovichina 
and Lundstrom, 2009b). 
Klasen (2010) defines an income growth episode ‘inclusive’ when it (a) 
allows participation and contribution by all members of society, with 
particular emphasis on the ability of the poor and disadvantaged to 
participate in growth (the ‘nondiscriminatory’ aspect of growth); and (b) 
associates with declining inequality in non-income dimensions of well-being 
that are particularly important for promoting economic opportunities, 
including education, health, nutrition, and social integration (the 
disadvantage ‘reducing’ an aspect of inclusive growth).  Klasen suggests 
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more formally that an inclusive growth requires (a) positive per capita 
income growth rate, (b) primary income growth rates for predefined, 
disadvantaged groups (e.g., ethnic minorities, backward regions, the income 
poor, rural areas, women) to be at least as high as growth rates for per capita 
incomes, indicating that such groups have been able to participate in the 
growth process at least proportionately, (c) expansion of non-income 
dimensions of well-being that exceed the average rate for predefined, 
disadvantaged groups (p. 10).   
Some policies may have a positive effect on both growth and inequality. 
The empirical cross-country literature suggests that growth has neither a 
positive nor a negative effect on inequality.
3)
  Lopez and Serven (2004) 
survey the empirical literature and conclude that macroeconomic stability as 
well as education and infrastructure-related policies seem to be win-win or 
‘super pro-poor’ policies that have both a positive effect on growth and 
negative effect on inequality.  
Inclusive growth links macroeconomic fundamentals such as 
macroeconomic stability and political stability with micro determinants such 
as investment in human capital, investment in physical infrastructure, 
tackling horizontal inequalities in basic service provision, discrimination by 
gender, ethnicity, religion etc., facilitating access to finance, and supporting 
broad-based skill development. 
However, there is no rule of thumb for general inclusive policy as it is a 
country-specific question but sustained growth patterns, structural 
transformation in finding a country’s own competitive advantage, broad-base 
productive (and decent) employment opportunities, equal opportunities  for 
all in terms of education and health, significant reduction of absolute poverty, 
and reduction in vertical and horizontal inequalities are important elements of 
inclusive growth (Addison and Nino-Zarazua, 2012).  The determinants are 
highly dependent on initial conditions such as level of income, poverty, and 
asset equality, as well as other factors such as geography, demography, 
governance, politics, social considerations, and a set of existing policies.  
                                                     
3) See  Deininger and Squire (1996), Ravallion (2001),  and Dollar and Kraay (2002). 
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These differ not only among countries, but also over time within the same 
country.  
Based on the above discussion, the question arises whether indicators can 
be derived to monitor inclusive growth at the country and project/program 
level.  In line with Klasen (2010), McKinley (2010) offers criteria and 
indicators that tend to be more consistent with measurable definition of 
inclusive growth in the areas of (i) growth, productive employment, and 
economic infrastructure; (ii) income inequality, poverty, and horizontal 
inequalities including gender and regional inequality; (iii) human 
capabilities; (iv) social protection; and (v) financial inclusion. 
 
 
2. THE STATUS OF INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
 
In this chapter, we mainly apply the indicators of inclusive growth 
suggested by McKinley (2010) and Addison and Nino-Zarazua (2012) to 
analyze the inclusive growth of the Republic of Korea.  
 
2.1. Economic Growth and Productive Employment 
 
Enhancing the growth of income per person is fundamental in advancing 
inclusive growth as this is the basis for creating and expanding economic 
opportunities.  However, growth does not necessarily correspond to broad-
based increases in productive employment.  Sometimes the pattern of growth 
generates limited new employment opportunities especially if a low-paid 
service sector expands but the growth of industry languishes.  Both the ADB 
and the World Bank have underscored the importance of decent employment 
opportunities as a critical aspect of inclusive growth. 
The growth rate of GDP per person is a proxy for labor productivity but it 
does not provide any real sense of the spread of productive employment since 
high levels of labor productivity could be driven mainly by advances in a 
minority of economic sectors.  The employment to population ratio is not 
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useful also since it gives no indication of the quality of employment.  Thus, 
one potentially viable candidate for a partial, approximate indicator of 
productive employment is the share of the employed or the economically 
active in industry or manufacturing.  A third complementary indicator is the 
share of workers in non-agricultural paid employment.  The share of own-
account workers and unpaid family workers in total employment, which 
focus on the extent of low-quality employment, can be used as a measure of 
vulnerable employment.  The lack of meaningful data on trends in productive 
employment is a serious weakness in the monitoring and evaluation of such 
progress.  In summary, a limited set of indicators is recommended for 
gauging the progress on achieving economic growth and generation 
employment, and expanding access to economic infrastructure (McKinley, 
2010). 
 
2.1.1. Economic growth 
Korea has recorded a 5.79 percent average annual GDP growth rate during 
1962-2010 in spite of the negative economic growth in 1980, 1997, and 
2008.  During 36 years from 1962 to 1997, in particular, Korea achieved an 
8.01 percent average annual GDP growth rate.  The average annual GDP 
growth rate per capita also registered 4.61 percent during the same period, 
recording a maximum growth rate of 7.3 percent during the period of 1988-
1992 (table 1). 
 
Table 1 Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP and of GDP per Capita 
 
1962-
1979 
(Park 
Jung-
hee) 
1980-
1987 
(Chun 
Doo-
hwan) 
1988-
1992 
(Roh 
Tae-
woo) 
1993-
1997 
(Kim 
Young-
sam) 
1998-
2002 
(Kim 
Dae-
jung) 
2003-
2007 
(Noh 
Mu-
hyun) 
2008-
2012 
(Lee 
Myung-
bak) 
1962-
2012 
Whole 
Period 
GDP (%) 8.46 7.43 8.36 7.10 4.46 4.34 2.92 6.81 
GDP              
per Capita (%) 
6.20 6.09 7.30 6.02 3.72 3.90 2.34 5.43 
Exports 25.59 13.46 7.10 17.34 11.02 13.20 4.86 16.39 
Note: ( ) represents the name of the president of Korea.  
Source: World Development Indicators, databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.  
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The GDP per capita (currency: US$) increased from 104 dollars in 1962 to 
22,590 dollars in 2012.  Rapid growth narrowed the per capita income gap 
with the United States from 62 percent in 1991 to 36 percent in 2010, 
reflecting progress in closing the productivity gap: from 72 percent to 52 
percent.
4)
  The convergence in income levels continued despite a slowdown 
in Korea’s potential growth rate from 7 percent in 1995 to around 4 percent 
by 2010.  Long-term trend growth, which had averaged 9.2 percent annually 
in 1971-1990 and 7.2 percent in 1991-1997, fell to 4.7 percent in 1998-2008 
after Korea underwent its foreign exchange crisis, and growth fell further to 
3.8 percent in 2009-2011.
5)
  It is expected to decrease to 2.8 percent in 2021-
2030.  Korea as an advanced industrialized economy has moved to the global 
technology frontier and has a rapidly aging population.  Its contribution for 
trend labor productivity fell from about five percentage points to three and its 
contribution for labor inputs has declined from two percentage points to one 
as working age population growth halved from 1.4 percent to 0.7 percent 
(OECD, 2012a).  Therefore, unless policies can help prevent the expected 
downtrend in productivity and labor inputs, the potential growth rate is 
expected to decline further.   
The tremendous growth of the Korean economy in the last 50 years has 
been accompanied by deep changes in its industrial structure.  The Korean 
economy was dominated by agriculture and underdeveloped service sector 
accounting respectively 39.4 percent and 39.3 percent in 1965.  Korea 
pursued an export-led industrialization from early 1960s and recorded a 
remarkable average annual export growth rate of 16.4 percent during the 
1962-2012 period.  The ‘First Five-year Economic Development Plan’ 
started in 1962.  Korea had a comparative advantage in exporting labor-
intensive light manufacturing products with its abundant supply of a 
relatively well-educated and diligent labor force.  
However, the Korean government faced severe economic and political 
                                                     
4) This is based on 2005 PPP exchange rates.  Productivity is measured by GDP per hour 
worked.  
5) Shin (2012), p. 4. 
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Table 2 Share of GDP by Sector (%), 1965-2011 
 1965 1979 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
Agriculture 39.4 20.9 10.8 7.7 5.4 4.0 2.9 2.7 
Industry 21.3 36.0 41.5 41.3 41.1 36.2 37.1 39.2 
(Manufacturing) (14.3) (24.3) (30.2) (26.6) (26.6) (26.2) (27.3) (31.2) 
Service 39.3 43.0 47.8 51.0 53.4 59.8 60.0 58.1 
Source: World Development Indicators, databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. 
 
environments involving increasing wage levels, with national self-defense 
gradually emphasizing the production of capital intensive ‘heavy and 
chemical industries’ as a major industry in the 1970s.  The share of the 
manufacturing industry increased from 14.3 percent in 1965 to 24.3 percent 
in 1979.  The share of heavy and chemical industries increased to 11.4 
percent in 1971-1980 from 5.8 percent in 1961-1970, while the share of 
agriculture decreased to 20.9 percent from 39.4 percent during 1965-1979 
(table 2).   
The real growth rate by industrial sector shows that the industry achieved 
the highest rate during 1960-2010, recording 12.03 percent in 1960-1980, 
8.31 percent in 1980-2000, and 5.32 percent in 2000-2010.  The service 
sector recorded 6.01 percent, 6.63 percent, and 3.59 percent, while the 
agriculture sector recorded 2.79 percent, 2.40 percent, and 1.35 percent 
respectively in the corresponding periods (Park and Shin, 2012).    
Entering the 1980s, private enterprises’ research and development (R&D) 
programs developed and improved high-productivity manufacturing.  These 
efforts gradually bore fruit, and the productivity gap with advanced industries 
narrowed significantly in the 1990s.  Korea leads globally in manufacturing 
Liquid Crystal Displays, memory chips, and smart phones.  It is the world’s 
largest shipbuilder and the 5th largest automobile manufacturer globally.  
The manufacturing industry’s share of GDP has decreased from 30.2 in 1987 
and has stagnated at around 26-28 percent in the 1990s and 2000s before 
rising to 30.5 percent in 2010, which is higher than its peer average 
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(18.3%).
6)
  
 
2.1.2. Productive employment 
The main instrument for a sustainable and inclusive growth is assumed to 
be productive employment.  The ability of individuals to be productively 
employed depends on the opportunities that allow the  full use of available 
resources as the economy evolves over time.  The  analysis  therefore looks 
at ways to strengthen the productive resources and capacity of the individual 
on the labor supply side as well as the ways to open up new opportunities for 
productive employment on the labor demand side.  If the main problem is 
related to the productive resources and the capacity of individuals, an in-
depth employability analysis is needed.  If the main problem is low 
productivity or lack of employment opportunities for individuals due to the 
limited demand for labor, an analysis of the bottlenecks in the business 
environment is necessary (Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, 2009a). 
Labor force participation in economic activities is one of the key factors 
for economic growth.  As for the labor force for the 15-64 age bracket, the 
participation rate is 65.4 percent which is below the OECD average of 72.3 
percent in 2010.  For women between the ages of 25 and 54, the rate was 62 
percent in 2010, which was the third lowest in the OECD area.  Also, 
Korea’s participation and employment rates for young people are one of the 
lowest in the OECD area, reflecting the large share in tertiary education.  The 
employment rate for the youth (15-24) was 22.9 percent in 2009, much lower 
than the OECD average of 40.6 percent. 
The employment rates have shown similar trends as participation rates 
since the unemployment rates have been fluctuating within relatively small 
range during the 1963-2010 periods.  However, the unemployment rate for 
youth is relatively high.  The employment rate for the 15-64 age group has 
been stagnant for more than ten years at around 63 percent.  This is below the 
OECD average of 66.6 percent due to particularly low employment for 
women and youth.  The female employment rate is 22-30 percentage points 
                                                     
6)  Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index 2013.   Korea ranks 5th among 38 countries. 
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Table 3 Number and Share in Total Employment by Sector  
                         (Thousand, %) for Selected Years 1965-2012 
 1965 1970 1979 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 
Total    
8,112 
(100) 
9,617 
(100) 
13,602 
(100) 
16,354 
(100) 
19,009 
(100) 
21,214 
(100) 
22,169 
(100) 
23,433 
(100) 
24,681 
(100) 
Agriculture  
4,742 
( 58.4 ) 
4,846 
(50.4) 
4,866 
(35.8) 
3,580 
(21.9) 
2,667 
(14.0) 
2,286 
(10.8) 
2,069 
(9.3) 
1,723 
(7.4) 
1,528 
(6.2) 
Industry 
840 
( 10.4) 
1,337 
(13.9) 
3,209 
(23.6) 
4,602 
(28.1) 
5,042 
(26.5) 
4,564 
(21.5) 
4,259 
(19.2) 
4,031 
(17.2) 
4,120 
(16.7) 
Manufactur-
ing 
764 
(9.4) 
1,268 
(13.2) 
3,099 
(22.8) 
4,416 
(27.0) 
4,986 
(26.2) 
4,537 
(21.4) 
4,241 
(19.1) 
4,014 
(17.1) 
4,105 
(16.6) 
Service 
2,530 
( 31.2) 
3,395 
(35.3) 
5,527 
(40.6) 
8,172 
(50.0) 
11,301 
(59.5) 
14,365 
(67.7) 
15,841 
(71.5) 
17,679 
(75.4) 
19,033 
(77.1) 
Source: Statistics Korea (http://kosis.kr).  
 
lower than that of males, even though it increased from 41.3 percent in 1980 
to 48.9 percent in 2007.  The persistence of a relatively low employment rate 
is worrisome because Korea faces the most rapid population aging, reflecting 
its lowest birth rate in the OECD area.  
The rapid aging of the population has slowed the working population.  The 
productive population covering individuals aged 15-64 increased in 1970-
1995 by an average annual rate of 2.5 percent, but it decreased to 0.6 in 
1996-2010.  Actually the annual average increase rate of the core productive 
population aged 25-49 decreased  to negative (–0.4%) in 2006-2010 from 2.8 
in 1970-1995 even though the total number of employment increased from 
about 8.1 million in 1965 to 23.8 million in 2010.  
The employment in agriculture decreased continuously from 58.4 percent 
in 1965 to 6.6 percent in 2010, while the employment in the service sector 
increased continuously from 31.2 percent to 76.4 percent during the same 
period.  The employment in the manufacturing sector increased from 9.4 
percent in 1965 to 27 percent in 1987, but it decreased continuously to 16.9 
percent in 2010 (table 3). 
The manufacturing sector has driven Korea’s rapid economic 
development, and its productivity is relatively high.  In contrast, Korea’s 
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service sector, which is dominated by SMEs, is markedly less productive.  
The Korean service sector’s productivity (value-added/hours) relative to 
manufacturing in 2007 was about 60 percent compared to 90 percent in the 
OECD.  In 2010, 16.9 percent of the manufacturing sector employment 
produced 30.5 percent of GDP, while 76.4 percent of the service sector 
employment produced 58.2 percent of GDP.  The service sector is important 
both in the employment and in the production share of GDP.  During the 
period of 2001-2010, manufacturing jobs created per hundred persons were 
–4.5 which was the lowest among the peer countries. 
 
2.1.3. Quality of employment 
The status of a worker is an important measure of the quality of the 
employed person.  Employed persons are composed of non-salary workers 
and wage and salary workers, and the former are composed of business 
owners with employees, without employee, and unpaid family workers.  The 
share of non-salary workers was 69.3 percent in 1965 reflecting a high share 
of employment in agriculture (58.4%) in 1965.  But its share continuously 
decreased to 28.2 percent in 2012 along with the decreasing share of 
agriculture during the same period.  The share of the unpaid family workers 
decreased rapidly from 32.3 percent in 1965 to 5.1 percent in 2012.  On the 
other hand, the share of wage and salary workers continuously increased 
from 30.7 percent in 1965 to 71.8 percent in 2012 reflecting the 
industrialization and structural changes in the Korean economy (table 4).   
However, 28.8 percent of the national workforce is self-employed in 2010 
which is fourth highest in the 34-nation OECD, and they are mainly small 
business owners of the self-employed in traditional service industries such as 
wholesale and retail sales, transportation, restaurant and lodging, real estate, 
and repairs.  The share of self-employed in the service industry in Korea is 
2.2 times that of the OECD countries’ average, with the share in the 
traditional service sector at more than 2.5 times the OECD average.  It is 2.9 
times for the transportation and warehouse sector, and 2.3 times for lodging 
and restaurants as well as wholesale, retail sale, and repair.   In contrast, in 
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Table 4 Employed Persons by Status of Worker (Thousand, %) 
for Selected Years 1965-2010 
By Status of 
Workers1) 
1965 1970 1979 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 
Total Employed 
Persons  
8,112 
(100) 
9,617 
(100) 
13,602 
(100) 
16,354 
(100) 
19,009 
(100) 
21,214 
(100) 
22,169 
(100) 
23,433 
(100) 
24,681 
(100) 
Non-salary 
Workers 
5,500 
(69.3) 
5,872 
(61.1) 
7,124 
(52.4) 
7,163 
(43.8) 
7,099 
(37.4) 
7,810 
(36.8) 
7,988 
(36.0) 
7,463 
(31.8) 
6,969 
(28.2 
Independent 
Business 
Owners 
2,984 
(37.0) 
3,286 
(34.2) 
4,571 
(33.6) 
4,994 
(30.5) 
5,171 
(27.2) 
5,901 
(27.8) 
6,190 
(27.9) 
6,049 
(25.8) 
5,712 
(23.2) 
Unpaid Family 
Workers 
2,516 
(32.3) 
2,586 
(26.9) 
2,553 
(18.8) 
2,169 
(13.3) 
1,928 
(10.2) 
1,908 
(9.0) 
1,797 
(8.1) 
1,413 
(6.0) 
1,251 
(5.1) 
Wage and  
Salary Workers 
2,609 
(30.7) 
3,746 
(39.0) 
6,479 
(47.6) 
9,191 
(56.2) 
11,910 
(62.7) 
13,404 
(63.2) 
14,181 
(64.0) 
15,970 
(68.2) 
17,712 
(71.8) 
Regular 
Employees 
- - - - 
6,838 
(36.0) 
7,282 
(34.3) 
6,862 
(31.0) 
8,629 
(36.8) 
11,097 
(45.0) 
Temporary 
Employees 
- - - - 
3,300 
(17.4) 
4,236 
(20.0) 
4,886 
(22.0) 
5,172 
(22.1) 
4,988 
(20.2) 
Daily Workers 
844 
(10.4) 
1,018 
(10.6) 
1,421 
(10.5) 
1,529 
(9.4) 
1,772 
(9.3) 
1,886 
(8.9) 
2,433 
(11.0) 
2,178 
(9.3) 
1,627 
(6.6) 
Notes: 1) employed persons = non-paid laborers + paid laborers, nonpaid laborers = business 
owners + unpaid family workers, business owners = business owners with employees + 
business owners without employee, paid laborers = full-time laborers + temporary 
laborers + one-day laborers. 
Source: Statistics Korea (http://kosis.kr), (OECD.StatExtracts).  
 
financial services, business support, and housekeeping, the share of self-
employed Koreans is lower than the OECD average (Kim, 2012).  The share 
of temporary employees also increased from 17.4 percent in 1992 to 23.0 
percent in 2010, which is the fourth highest incidence in the OECD area  
along with the increasing share of employment in the service sector. 
A structural weakness in the Korean labor market is the severe growing 
inequality which is closely associated with the rising share of non-standard 
forms of work that involve lower pay, worsening working conditions, and 
lack of coverage by social insurance schemes compared to standard jobs.  
The share of non-regular workers defined as temporary, part-time, and 
atypical (such as workers dispatched by temporary agencies) employees 
increased from 31 percent of employment in 2001 to 36 percent in 2007 
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before falling to 33 percent in 2010 as firms dismissed non-regular workers 
to reduce employment in the wake of the global economic crisis.  
In 2010, the average wage of non-regular workers was 45 percent below 
that of regular workers, while their productivity was only 22 percent lower. 
In 2010, 38 percent of non-regular workers were covered by the National 
Pension Scheme, 41 percent by the Employment Insurance Scheme, and 42 
percent by the National Health Insurance (OECD, 2011).  The share of non-
regular workers among the wage and salary workers was over 50 percent in 
2002, even though its share decreased to 38.7 percent in 2010 by increasing 
the share of regular employees since 2003.  The share of the part-time 
workers (1-17 hours per week)  also increased from 0.4 percent of 
employment in 1981 to 4.4 percent in 2010, due to structural changes in the 
overall economy. 
The share of the business owner without employee own-account workers 
decreased from 29.0 percent in 1980 to 17.2 percent in 2010, even though its 
number increased up to 4.6 million in 2002 after the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1998 and decreased to 4.1 million in 2010.  The high share of non-regular 
workers was driven primarily by firms’ need for employment flexibility and 
lower wage costs including the savings on welfare costs.  As a group, non-
regular workers tended to be older, less educated, employed in SMEs, had 
short tenure, and work in the service sector.  To be specific, 42 percent of 
female employees were in non-regular employment compared to 28 percent 
of males.  
 
2.2. Inequality and Poverty  
 
2.2.1. Functional income distribution 
According to modern Keynesian theories, the functional income 
distribution strongly depends on political and economic factors.  On the other 
hand, the neoclassical approach has treated the stability of functional income 
distribution as an empirical fact based on a strictly techno-economic 
explanation with the substitutable factor of production.  
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Table 5 Share of Wages in GDP in Selected Countries, 1970-2010 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
France 66.4 70.3 71.7 68.0 62.4 60.3 60.5 61.0 61.4 
United  
Kingdom 
67.6 70.6 67.1 61.9 62.9 60.3 62.8 61.4 62.6 
United States 65.3 63.7 64.6 62.0 62.6 61.4 61.5 59.7 59.0 
Japan 43.0 55.0 54.6 55.0 54.1 57.3 57.0 54.8 55.0 
Republic of  
Korea 
37.1 35.3 44.3 45.2 50.5 52.7 48.6 51.6 50.6 
Argentina 44.1 47.6 40.5 39.5 38.6 41.9 39.4 31.6 41.5 
Chile 47.8 45.3 43.3 42.4 38.7 40.9 46.5 42.5 44.1 
Note: Data refer to total compensation of employees as a percentage of GDP at factor costs.  
Source: UNCTAD (2012b), p. 48. 
     
The annual average growth rate of real wage in 1964-2008 was 6.3 percent 
of the high growth rates in the late 1960s and 1980s.   The share of wages 
had shown an upward trend since the late 1970s owing to a significant 
increase of real wages in manufacturing, in parallel with industrial upgrading, 
possibly related to changes in both labor market and political conditions 
(UNCTAD, 2012b).  However, Korea’s share of wage in GDP was 50.6 in 
2010, which was significantly lower compared to other advanced countries 
even though it was higher than those of South American countries.  Real 
wage growth lagging behind the productivity gains had been a salient feature 
of economic development in most countries.  The shares of wage in GDP in 
the United States and other developed countries showed a decreasing trend 
since 1970 (table 5).  
 
2.2.2. Income inequality and poverty 
    The Gini coefficient gives a summary measure for the income distribution 
without providing direct information about the nature of changes within the 
entire range.  The poverty rate and the 5th income distribution ratio of the 
population are used to measure vertical inequalities in income distribution as 
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Table 6 Income Distribution and Poverty Rates, 
Selected Years 1992-2012 
 1992 1997 2003 2007 2012 
Gini coefficient 
0.245 
(0.254) 
0.257 
(0.264) 
0.270 
(0.283) 
0.295 
(0.321) 
0.285 
(0.311) 
Relative Poverty 
Rate (%) 
6.5 
(7.4) 
8.2 
(8.7) 
10.6 
(12.1) 
12.9 
(15.5) 
12.2 
(24.3) 
5th Ratio 
3.52 
(3.71) 
3.80  
(3.97) 
4.22  
(4.66) 
5.95 
(6.05) 
4.69  
(5.79) 
Notes: Urban households above 2 persons, disposal income  base.  ( ) is market income base 
before transfers and taxes.    
Source: Korea Statistics Office. 
 
complements.  In addition, horizontal inequalities between rural and urban 
areas, gender, and specific income groups are also considered. Korea’s 
income inequality and relative poverty rate have been continuously 
deteriorated in terms of the Gini coefficient, relative poverty rate, and 5th 
income distribution ratio since 2003 (table 6).  
In terms of the Gini coefficient, Korea’s income distribution was not so 
bad compared to OECD countries even though its increasing trend was a 
problem.  However, Korea’s relative poverty rate after taxes and transfers for 
the entire population was 14.3 percent in 2006, ninth highest in the OECD, 
which increased even more to 15.2 in the late 2000 compared to the OECD 
average of 11.2 percent.  Korea’s 5th income distribution ratios also showed 
that income inequality had been deteriorating since 1997.  The 5th ratio 
increased from 3.97 in 1997 to 6.02 in 2010,
7)
 then it decreased to 5.79 in 
2012. 
Most of the advanced OECD countries had a high level of income 
inequality before taxes and transfers compared to Korea, but tax and welfare 
systems had greater effects on income redistribution especially in France, 
Germany, and Sweden.  The poverty rates before taxes and transfers for the 
OECD (26.3%) including those of advanced countries were also very high 
                                                     
7) This is for urban households with over 2 residents (market income, before taxes and 
transfers), Korean Statistical Information Service (kosis.kr). 
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compared to that of Korea (17.5%) in the late 2000.  These results showed 
that Korea’s tax/benefit system was not effective in reducing inequality and 
poverty, even though Korea’s income distribution before taxes and transfers 
was relatively more even compared to OECD countries.  For example, 
Korea’s Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers in the late 2000 was 0.344 
compared to 0.457 for OECD average, and the poverty rate was 17.5 percent 
compared to the OECD average of 26.3 percent.   
On average, Korean households received just 4 percent of their income 
from the government in the form of cash benefits and pay not more than 8 
percent of their income in taxes and social contributions.  These are by far 
the lowest level in the OECD.  In a typical OECD country, cash benefits 
constituted some 22 percent of income, and taxes paid some 29 percent of 
income (OECD, 2011).  However, Korea introduced an Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) in 2008, which would help better target the tax/benefit system 
for low-income households. 
In connection with the income inequality of Korea, Korea had to pay much 
more attention to questions of equity and poverty alleviation because of its 
position of competition with North Korea at the early stage of economic 
development.  However, at the beginning of the economic development in 
the 1960s, South Korea had already very equalized income and assets due to 
land reform and had totally destroyed the industrial facilities during the 
Korean War in 1950-1953.  Its most important objective was an increase in 
income, therefore. Korea succeeded in the reduction of absolute poverty to 5 
percent in mid-1980s from 23 percent in 1970.
8)
  Rapid poverty alleviation in 
Korea was brought about by a number of factors as follows (World Bank, 
2004). 
They are: (i) the President Park regime’s strong leadership and 
commitment of economic development at the top its priorities; (ii) market 
economic system and outward-looking industrialization strategy; (iii) 
continuous enhancements of human resources and productivity through 
education;  (iv)  land reform in 1945-1950, the ‘green revolution’, and the 
                                                     
8) Kwon (1998).  
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New Community Movement (NCM) for rural development in the 1970s;  and  
(v) expansion of employment in the manufacturing sector by private 
entrepreneurship.  
Despite Korea’s high economic growth with relatively equal income 
distribution until mid-1990s, certain measures of inequality had been 
trending upward since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, indicating 
deteriorating socioeconomic conditions.  There were many potential factors 
responsible for rising inequality, including those related to technological 
progress and globalization.  In the case of Korea, a key factor was the 
structural change in the economy, including a shift from high-paying jobs in 
manufacturing to lower-paying job in services.  Labor market dualism, which 
resulted in large wage gaps between regular and non-regular workers, was 
another dimension of inequality (Elekdag, 2012).  The low wages of non-
regular workers had been a key factor in the rise in the Gini coefficient and 
relative poverty.  According to a recent survey (Lee, 2011), 20 percent of 
non-regular workers were in relative poverty in 2010.    
 
2.2.3. Gender inequality  
According to the Global Gender Gap Index (WEF, 2012),
9)
 which 
examines the gap between men and women in four fundamental categories 
— economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health 
and survival, and political empowerment, Korea ranks 108 out of 135 
countries.  The rank of the economic opportunity sub-index was specifically 
116, reflecting low female to male ratio in labor force participation (0.73), 
wage equality to similar work (0.54), estimated earned income (0.44), 
legislators, senior officials, and managers (0.11), and professional and 
technical workers (0.69). 
Sex ratio at birth (female/male) was 0.93 which positioned its rank at 121, 
while both the rank of the ‘literacy rate’ and the ‘health life expectancy’ was 
1 reflecting high female to male ratio (–1.0 is to 1.09).  Korea’s gender gap in 
                                                     
9) The index is designed to measure gender-based gaps in access to resource and opportunities 
in each country. 
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median earnings of full-time employees was 38.9 in 2009, which was the 
highest among the OECD 26 countries’ average of 15.8, even though the 
trends in gender wage gap were decreasing from 51.8 percent in 1985 to 38.5 
percent in 2005.
10)
  The average earnings of females as a percentage of males 
in tertiary education in the 35-44 age cohort was 84 in 2007, which was 
higher than that of the OECD average 71 (OECD, 2012b).  
 
2.3. The Human Capital 
 
So far, inclusiveness has been addressed in terms of productive 
employment opportunity and inequalities.  Thus, the attention has primarily 
been on the demand side of the achievement of equitable access to 
opportunities and outcomes.  However, even if inclusive growth is defined 
narrowly, the supply side of such access; that is, whether the working 
population possesses the human capabilities necessary to be productively 
employed to take advantage of available economic opportunities needs to be 
addressed.  
Good outcomes in nutrition, health, and education are development goals 
in themselves, because they directly improve people’s lives, but they also 
equip people for productive employment and job opportunities.  Through this 
channel, human capital drives economic and social advances.  Together, 
nutrition, health, and education combine to form human skills and abilities 
that link powerfully to productivity growth and poverty reduction. 
 
    2.3.1. Health  
Mortality rates are often used to identify vulnerable populations. 
Moreover, they are among the indicators most frequently used to compare 
socioeconomic development across countries.  The under-five mortality 
rate
11)
 of Korea was 100.3 in 1962, but it decreased continuously to 6.0 in 2010 
                                                     
10) The gender-wage gap is unadjusted and is calculated as the difference between median 
earnings of men and women relative to median earnings of men. 
11) Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before 
reaching age five if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. 
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Table 7 Expenditure on Health 
 1995 2000 2005 2011 
Per capita total expenditure on 
health (PPP, int.US$) 
480 
(1,554) 
771 
(1,974) 
1,291 
(2,491) 
2,181 
(3,174) 
Total expenditure on health as a 
percentage of GDP (%) 
3.8 
(6.8) 
4.5 
(7.6) 
5.7 
(8.2) 
7.2 
(9.3) 
General government expenditure 
on health as percentage of total 
government expenditure (%) 
7.1 
(15.5) 
9.7 
(16.2) 
11.3 
(18.3) 
13.7 
(18.2) 
Note: ( ) represents the figures of the Japan. 
Source: World Health Organization,  country statistics, Republic of Korea. 
 
which was less than the OECD average of 8.1.  Per capita total expenditure 
on health  continuously increased from 480 dollars in 1995 to 2,181 dollars in 
2012.  Total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP also continuously 
increased from 3.8 percent in 1995 to 7.2 percent in 2012.  As government’s 
national health insurance coverage expanded, general government 
expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure 
increased to 13.7 percent in 2012 from 7.1 percent in 1995 (table 7).  
During the past five decades Korea’s ‘life expectancy at birth’ increased 
greatly.  It indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if the 
prevailing pattern of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same 
throughout its life.  It was 53 years (51.9 for males, 57.2 for females) in 
1963, but it increased to 80.8 years (77.4 for males, 84.3 for females) in 
2010, which was a little higher compared to the OECD members’ average of 
79.3 years. 
 
2.3.2. Education 
Generally, education can empower men and women by providing them 
with better economic opportunities.  Most Koreans have strived to improve 
human abilities through education since the human capacity is the major 
determinant for higher income and social upgrading.  Parents have a higher 
desire for their children to be academically accomplished.  The expansion 
and improvement of primary and secondary education contributed to 
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attaining a more equal income distribution.  Thus, Korea’s high level of 
education contributed not only to its rapid economic growth but also to 
equitable income distribution.  OECD (2011) commends Korea for its 
economic growth’s promotion of social progress, creating a virtuous circle of 
rising living standards for an increasingly healthy and well-educated labor 
force, thus favoring further prosperity increases.    
Net primary school enrollment rate was already 96.5 percent in 1971, 
whereas net secondary school enrollment rate was 36 percent. Secondary 
education aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human 
development by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction.   
However, by both demand and supply side emphasis on education, net 
secondary school enrollment rate increased continuously to 64.9 percent in 
1979, 94.2 percent in 2002, and 96 percent in 2010, which was above the 
OECD member’s 87.7 percent.  Almost 80 percent of the students passing 
high school enrolled for tertiary education, which was the highest in OECD 
countries. 
In 2011, 72.5 percent of high school graduates advanced to tertiary 
education, but in recent years only about half of university graduates have 
found regular jobs.  Consequently, 25 percent of tertiary graduates under age 
of 30 in 2009 were inactive, engaged neither in employment nor in education, 
doubling the OECD average of 12.5 percent.  
Korea has expanded public outlays for Early Childhood Education and 
Care (ECEC) by broadening the eligibility for tuition subsidies from the 
bottom 10 percent of households in the income distribution to the lower 70 
percent.  Nevertheless, spending on pre-primary education was only 0.2 
percent of GDP in 2008, the second lowest in the OECD area (OECD, 
2012a). 
Korean students have achieved high performances in Reading, 
Mathematics, and Science in PISA, but private tutoring results gap has 
widened in SAT scores.  Private tutoring expenditure accounts 2.1 percent of 
GDP while public education expenditure accounts 4.2 percent of GDP, which 
is low compared to the OECD average of 5.2 percent in 2007.  
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2.4. Social Protection 
 
ADB usually incorporates social protection as an additional dimension of 
its inclusive growth strategic framework.  Social protection is defined as 
consisting of five major kinds of activities: labor market policies and 
programs, social insurance programs, social assistance programs, micro/area-
based schemes, and child protection.
12)
  Among the labor market programs, 
direct employment generation, labor exchanges and other employment 
services, and labor legislation  are included. 
 
2.4.1. Social spending  
Social spending in Korea is low when compared to OECD countries.  
Korea has the second lowest level of public social spending next to Mexico 
at 9.4 percent compared to the OECD average of 22.1 percent in 2009.  In 
particular, public social spending in Korea is lower than the OECD average 
in each of the following major areas: health care, pensions, and income 
support to the working-age population such as unemployment benefits.  
Further, both family- and old age-related expenditures of Korea rank 
relatively low.  
However, public social spending tripled its share of GDP to 9.6 percent in 
2009, from 2.8 percent in 1990, even though it is less than half of 22.1 
percent of the OECD-total (table 8).  It increased to an 11 percent annual rate 
in real terms between 1990 and 2009, the fastest in the OECD area. In 
particular, health, family, active labor market, and unemployment 
expenditures increased rapidly since the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. 
Public social expenditure in percentage of total general government 
expenditure also doubled to 28.4 percent in 2009 from 14.4 percent in 1990. 
Besides its low level, Korea’s social spending is not well-targeted, as only 
a quarter of total cash benefits from the government go to the poorest 20 
percent of the population.  The problem of poor targeting is partly due to 
blind spots in coverage, particularly among the self-employed and non-regular 
                                                     
12) ADB (2011), p. 13. 
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Table 8 Public Social Expenditure by Major Categories 
in Percentage of GDP  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Total 
2.8 
(3.1) 
3.2 
(3.7) 
4.8 
(5.7) 
6.5 
(7.2) 
9.6 
(10.5) 
▪ OECD-Total 17.6 19.5 18.9 19.7 22.1 
 Old Age 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.5 2.1 
 Health 1.5 1.4 2.2 3.0 4.0 
 Family 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 
Active Labor Market 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.6 
Unemployment - - 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Note: ( )  public social expenditure  and  mandatory private social expenditure in percentage of 
GDP. 
Source: OECD.StatsExtracts (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure). 
 
workers (OECD, 2012a). 
However, according to the analysis of  Elekdag (2012), Korea’s social 
spending gap with respect to the OECD average narrows to about 3.4 
percentage points instead of 11.7 percent point considering lower 
unemployment rates, low dependency ratios, and per capita income levels of 
Korea compared to other OECD countries. 
 
2.4.2. Social assistance 
The Basic Livelihood Security Program (BLSP), Korea’s major welfare 
program provides cash and a package of in-kind benefits, including housing, 
medical, and educational benefits, to those living under the absolute poverty 
line.  Although BLSP benefits have increased at a double- digit rate, they 
amounted to only 0.9 percent of GDP in 2009.  Benefits are provided to only 
3 percent of the population, half of it to those living below the absolute 
poverty line and far below 15 percent of households living in relative 
poverty. 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is another important tool for 
reducing poverty. Korea introduced this in-work tax credit in 2008, targeting 
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the 7.4 million daily and temporary workers.  The government estimated that 
only 0.6 million households (8.1% of targeted workers) received the EITC in 
2009, with a total payment of KRW454 billion (0.04% of GDP).  The 
average payment was thus around US$680 per household in 2009.  Given 
that the average wage of the 5.8 million non-regular workers is around 
KRW16 million per year, there will be large potential recipients. 
 
2.4.3. Pensions 
Public spending on old-age benefits was 1.6 percent of GDP in 2007, a 
quarter of the OECD average, reflecting the fact that the National Pension 
Scheme (NPS) was introduced in 1988.  Only one-fifth of the elderly receive 
pensions, which are only partial.  The basic Old-Age Pension System, 
introduced in 2008, provides assistance to elderly people who meet the 
income and asset criteria.  At present, around 70 percent of the elderly 
receive benefit, which is set to only 5 percent of the average wage, implying 
that the benefit spreads out resources very thinly over a large segment of the 
older population (OECD, 2012a). 
Beginning in 2028, retirees will begin to receive NPS benefits although the 
replacement rate will be only 40 percent, well below the OECD average of 
58 percent (OECD, 2011).  In addition to low replacement rate, 30 percent of 
the working-age population did not contribute to public pension programs in 
2010 even though participation was mandatory.  Further, the lack of 
transparency about the income of self-employed and family workers limits 
their contributions. 
 
2.4.4. Health care 
The National Health Insurance (NHI) coverage of medical treatments has 
been limited as it focused initially on achieving the universal coverage of the 
population.   Meanwhile, the volume of health care has been restrained by 
co-payments that are highest in the OECD area.  Consequently, the private 
sector’s share of health spending is 41 percent, the fourth highest in the 
OECD area.  High out-of-pocket payments are inequitable and regressive 
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because they do not depend on the income, resulting in inequality in the 
economic burden of illness, boosting poverty, and reducing necessary health 
care.    
In 2010, around 40 percent of non-regular workers were covered by the 
NPS, NHI, and the Employment Insurance System (EIS).  More than half of 
employees at firms with less than ten workers were not covered by any of the 
three major social security systems, compared to only 4.6 percent at firms 
with more than 100 workers (OECD, 2012a).  In 2010, 30 percent of the 
working-age population did not contribute to public pension programs even 
though participation was mandatory.  
 
2.5.  Financial Exclusion 
 
Household debt and bipolarization of capital supply are major challenges 
to the Korean economy as well as to inclusive growth.  Around 1.96 million 
people are estimated to have difficulty accessing loans from financial 
institutions in Korea (Lee, 2011).  However, 7 to 8 million persons, about 
one-fifth of the adult population, are not eligible for bank loans by lack of 
appropriate collateral or credit guarantee.  Most of them are low-income 
households or low-credit rating (7-10) individuals.  There are 1.5 million 
National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) recipients and 4 million next-
upper low income households who are excluded from the NBLS because of 
1.0-1.2 times higher income than minimum cost of living.
13)
  In addition, the 
Korean government considers those households with an annual income of 
less than KRW 40 million as potential clients for financial supports even 
though they are 5 or 6 credit rating persons. 
Therefore, Korea has to respond to increasing household debt problems 
and, at the same time, to ensure low-income households’ financial inclusion 
which is an important gateway to social inclusion and a valuable measure to 
ensure low-income households’ access to loans and government-pronounced 
                                                     
13) Minimum cost of living per month (2012): 1 person household: KRW553,354; 2 persons: 
KRW942,197; 3 persons: KRW1,218,873; 4 persons: KRW1,495,550 (US$1,360). 
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expansion of resources for the microcredit programs (table 9). 
The Smile Microcredit Bank was established in 2009 by the dormant 
account deposits and insurances of financial institutions and donations from 
six leading multinationals and five key domestic banks
14)
 with a primary 
business aim to provide very small business loans (microloans) to people 
who find it difficult to use financial institutions, who lack collateral, or are in 
poverty.  Designed to spur entrepreneurship among those in the low-
income/low-credit category with little to no collateral and help them to start a 
business, Smile Credit bank not only supplies funds but also conducts 
business management consultation.  
Sunshine Loans are commerce-based but government-guaranteed loans 
from cooperatives and savings banks and started on July 2010.  Sunshine 
loan providers consist of various commercial financial firms such as 
community credit cooperatives, community unions, mutual savings banks, 
and agricultural, fishery, and forest cooperatives. 
Commercial banks launched New Hope Loan on November 2010, which 
was the expanded version of  ‘Hope Loan’ started in 2009.  The New Hope 
Loan was a client-tailored loan meant for low-income/low-credit rating 
individuals and a wider range of lower income households based on specific 
loan process.   
Switching loan is a loan modification program that helps indebted low-
income/low-credit ratings households (individuals) to switch their high-
interest loans borrowed from money lenders, mutual savings banks, and other 
non-bank financial institutions to low-interest loans and to provide loan 
brokerage services tailored to low-income households’ needs. 
In sum, Korea’s microfinance programs are mainly microcredit programs 
for low-income/low-credit ratings individuals having business purpose.  
Saving and insurance products are only a small fraction of the programs. 
Non-profit organizations such as the Smile Microcredit Bank and its 
affiliated organizations, saving banks, community unions and cooperatives, 
                                                     
14)
 Total fund is KRW1,172 billion (dormant deposit: 398.4; dormant insurance: 192.3; 
donations: 581.3) as of 2011. 
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Table 9 Microcredit Programs for Low-income/Low-credit  
Rating Persons 
 
Smile Microcredit 
Loan 
(Micro-insurance 
excluded) 
Sunshine Loan 
(common brand) 
New Hope Loan 
Switching 
Loan (loan 
modification 
program) 
Microfinance 
Providers or Credit 
Guarantee Institutions 
Smile Microcredit 
Bank:162 (76 
companies, 53 
banks, 33 Regional 
branches) 
Mutual savings 
bank, Community  
unions and 
Cooperatives 
(3,750) 
Commercial 
Banks, Specialized 
Banks (16) 
KAMCO Credit 
Recovery Fund 
(credit 
guarantee) 
Application 
Qualification 
(Individual/household) 
(KRW) 
•Credit ratings: 
 7-10 
•Low income  
households
*
  
•Credit ratings: 6-
10(Income≤40 
million) 
•Income≤26 
million 
- small business  
owners 
- farmers 
- temporary  
workers 
• Credit rating: 
5-10 
(Income≤40 
million) 
•Income≤30million   
• Credit rating: 
  6-10  
(Income≤40 
million)  
•Income≤26 
million 
  
 
Annual interest rate, 
% 
2.0 -4.5 
•Cooperatives: 
9.04 
•Savings 
banks:10.69 
11.0-14.0 8.0-12.0 
Maximum Loan limit 
(KRW) 
• Operation fund: 
20 million  
•New business 
fund: 70 million  
•Non-registered 
business owner: 5 
million  
•Emergency fund: 
10 million  
•Business 
operation fund: 
20 million  
•New business 
fund: 50 million  
• Switching loan: 
  30 million  
• 20 million  • 30 million  
Accumulated 
Total Loan 
(KRW) 
• 713.4 billion  
• 83,046 cases 
(2008.7- 
2012.10.31) 
• 2,288.9 billion  
• 258,119 cases 
(2010.7.26-
2012.10.31) 
• 3,019.2 billion  
• 344,624 cases 
(2010.11.18-
2012.9.30) 
• 1,349.3 billion  
• 130,140 cases 
(2008.12.18-
2012.10.31) 
Average Loan (KRW) 8,590 thousand  8,870 thousand  8,760 thousand  10,370 thousand  
Delinquency rate , % 
(2012.9) 
5.2 9.6
**
 2.6  8.5
**
 
Notes: * National Basic Livelihood Security recipients and  household income  are less than 
1.2 times of the Minimum Cost of Living set by the government.  KRW: Korean 
currency unit, Won (2011 average exchange rate: US$1.00 = KRW1,108), **  For 
Sunshine loan and Switching loan, the rates are reimbursement rates of the credit 
guarantee institutions.  
Source: Korea Finance Service Commission (http://www.fsc.go.kr). 
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commercial and specialized banks, and credit guarantee institutions 
participate in the programs.  All types of loans are individual-based, not 
group loan. Smile Microcredit Bank supplies loan fund to traditional market 
merchants’ association and social welfare institutions, but they still loan and 
manage it in individual base.  Collateral or personal credit guarantor is not 
required for the loans except credit guarantee institutions’ credit guarantee, 
with a small amount of fee for the Sunshine Loan. 
 
 
3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
 
3.1. Economic and Social Policies 
 
Ali and Zhuang (2007) argue that given if inclusive growth focuses on 
both creating economic opportunity and ensuring equal access, an effective 
inclusive growth strategy should have three policy pillars: (i) high, efficient, 
and sustained growth to create productive jobs and economic opportunity; (ii) 
social inclusion to ensure equal access to opportunity-investing in education, 
health, and other social services that expand human capacity especially that 
of the disadvantaged, and eliminating market and institutional failures and 
social exclusion to level the playing field; (iii) social safety nets to mitigate 
the effects of transitory livelihood shocks and to prevent extreme poverty.   
Finally, all three policy pillars need to be supported by good governance and 
institutions.  
 
3.1.1. Economic growth and productive employment 
Korea has achieved inclusive growth in terms of high economic growth, 
high per capita income, and industrial structure transformation.  However, 
Korea has to maintain sustainable growth while facing rapid population aging 
and expected down trend in productivity in the future.  Under the condition 
of the high shares of the service sector in GDP (58% in 2010) and in total 
employment (76% in 2010), addressing the downward trend of productivity 
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in the service sector is very important for inclusive growth.  Labor 
productivity growth in services decelerated from an annual rate of 2.6 percent 
during the 1980s to 1.2 percent between 1997 and 2007, in contrast to nearly 
9 percent growth in manufacturing since 1990.   
Productivity in services fell from 76 percent of that in manufacturing in 
1997 to 60 percent in 2005, the largest gap in the OECD area, where 
productivity in manufacturing and services was roughly equal.  The 
productivity gap widened more to 53 percent in 2008, which is far below 
OECD average 87 percent.  This implies that more well-developed services 
can contribute a lot to whole productivity increase and economic growth.  
The central challenge for Korea in the post-industrial phase is thus to 
overhaul and upgrade its service sector so that a productive, high value-
added, modern service sector can become an engine of growth (Park and 
Shin, 2012). 
Studies suggest that strengthening competition through regulatory reform, 
upgrading competition policy, promoting structural transformation to post-
industrial economic policies, increasing R&D expenditures, and lowering 
barriers to trade and FDI can increase the level and rate of productivity 
growth by stimulating business investment and promoting innovation 
(Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005; Park and Shin, 2012).  Enhancing competition 
and business environments in key service sectors such as 
telecommunications, financial services, and business services are essential.  
In addition, the government should provide fiscal and other incentives to 
promote high value-added services such as design at the beginning and the 
end of the global value chain.  So-called Meeting, Incentive Tourism, 
Convention, and Exhibition (MICE) industries should be developed as new 
areas of service sector in Korea.  
The amount of labor input in economic activities is one of the key factors 
for economic growth, and it depends on the number of productive population, 
participation rate, employment rate, and average working hours.  Korea’s 
exceptionally fast population aging by low fertility rate is predicted to make 
the country the second oldest by 2050.  The labor force participation rates for 
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women and youth are very low compared to OECD countries.  The average 
working hours is seeing a decreasing trend as with other advanced countries. 
Therefore, increasing the female and youth participation rate and youth 
employment rate are important for inclusive growth.  Studies suggest policy 
measures such as expanding the availability of affordable, high-quality child 
care, promoting the use of maternity and parental leave, encouraging family-
friendly workplaces, and reducing labor market dualism to increase the 
female participation rate.  For increasing youth participation rate and 
employment rate, improvement of the quality of vocational education and 
upgrading the quality of tertiary education are suggested (OECD, 2012b).  
Korea has two challenges in terms of employment status. The first is the 
high share of non-salary workers, most of which are small business owners 
or the self-employed in traditional service areas with low productivity.  The 
second is the high share of non-regular workers and their low wage and 
social insurance coverage.  Non-regular workers earned 57 percent as much 
as regular workers in 2010, and only around 40 percent of non-regular 
workers were covered by the NPS, NHI, and employment insurance system 
(EIS) (OECD, 2012b).  The structural weakness in the Korean labor market 
is closely associated with growing income inequality, lack of social 
protection, and gender inequality.  
The problems of high share of the self-employed small business owner are 
overcrowded markets, new start-ups by senior groups, and high debt burden, 
which should be handled with policy measures decreasing its share.  The 
problems are related to those of the service sector with low productivity, tax, 
and social welfare systems including insufficient pension system, mandatory 
retirement system, etc.  Kim (2012) suggests (i) restructuring, (ii) control 
entry, and (iii) support to create a dynamic self-employment environment. 
To promote stability and rehabilitation of livelihood for the self-employed, 
diverse financial policy support and microfinance measures are suggested 
(pp. 11-12).  Innovation should be fostered by a pro-competitive business 
environment providing ready access to information, essential business 
services, and finance. 
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Labor market dualism creates serious equity problems as a significant 
portion of the labor force involved in precarious jobs giving relatively low 
wages and less protection in terms of social insurance.  Stricter protection for 
regular workers has a higher incidence of temporary employment.  Reducing 
dualism requires weakening the incentives that encourage firms to hire non-
regular workers.  OECD (2012b) suggests relaxing employment protection 
for regular workers, increasing the coverage of non-regular workers by the 
social safety net and expanding training opportunities for non-regular 
workers to enhance their employment prospects.  
The solution of the non-regular workers’ problem hinges on how and to 
which degree we can properly harmonize the security and flexibility of 
employment.  Thus, one of the legal issues related to non-regular workers is 
the possibility and limit of the employment enforcement.  Policies should 
work to secure increased social insurance participation, greater human and 
career developement opportunities and stable income for non-regular workers 
(Keum and Yi, 2013). 
 
3.1.2. Inequality and poverty 
Economic and social inequalities are increasing even though there is no 
absolute poverty in Korea.  Functional distribution of GDP for wages has 
been deteriorating since 1995.  Vertical income inequalities measured by the 
Gini coefficient, relative poverty ratio, and 5th ratios show worsening trends 
as well as horizontal equalities.  
The causes of inequality and of changes in equality can be various.  
Globalization and financial liberalization, technology advancement, 
economic reform and industrial restructuring, market imperfection, 
government policies and institutions in distribution, and others can be 
presented as causes.  From the policy-making perspective, it is useful to 
differentiate inequality due to differences in individual circumstances from 
that due to differences in individual efforts (Roemer, 2006).   Inequalities due 
to differences in circumstances often reflect social exclusion arising from 
institutional weaknesses, market failures, or policy deficiencies, and thus 
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should be addressed through public policy intervention (Zhuang, 2008).  
Real wage growth lagging behind productivity gains is one of the causes of 
falling labor share in GDP.  In developed countries, the share of labor income 
fell by 5 percentage points or more between 1980 and the onset of the global 
financial crisis in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2012a).  The share of wage in GDP in 
Korea also decreased to 50.6 percent in 2010 from 52.7 percent in 1995.  
Real wage rise rate recorded negative in 2008 and 2009, and the real 
minimum wage rate increased only 1.4 percent in the period of 2008-2011, 
which was the lowest since it was introduced in 1988.
15)
  Rebalancing income 
distribution must be a leading policy objective for Korea.  Higher wages and 
lower inequality can stimulate demand and output growth, which in turn can 
provide incentives for increased investment in productivity capacity, with 
attendant effects on employment creation and productivity gains.  
The government should resist adopting a ‘flexible labor market’ and 
instead enact active income policies.  A comprehensive income policy 
linking wage and productivity growth including legal minimum wages and a 
tight social safety net for poor families would favor investment dynamics and 
monetary stability (UNCTAD, 2012a).  Flexible labor market policy should 
be at least accompanied with corresponding well-developed social safety net 
programs, so-called flex-security policies.  Leveling up the minimum wage 
level should be enacted considering the low real rise rate in the past years. 
Legal minimum wages and their regular adjustments can provide an 
important reference for wage negations in the private sector. 
Korea’s income inequality before taxes and transfers was relatively good 
because of ‘shared growth’ until the mid-1990s.  However, Korea’s relative 
poverty rate after taxes and transfers was high and had increased even more 
in the late 2000s.  This shows that Korea’s taxes and transfer system have not 
been effective in reducing inequality and relative poverty.  As explained 
above, labor market dualism and the low wages of non-regular workers are 
                                                     
15) Real minimum wage rate increased 3.1% in 1993-1997 (Kim Young-sam), 5.5% in 1998-
2002 (Kim Dae-jung), and 7.7 % in 2003-2007 (Roh Moo-hyun).  Minimum real wage is 
KRW4,580 in 2012.   
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key factors in the rise of inequality.  
Korea’s low tax burden — 25.1% of GDP 2010 compared to 33.2 percent 
of OECD average — will need to rise to finance the expansion of welfare 
programs and to reduce inequality.  However, pro-growth tax policy calls for 
limiting any increase in the tax wedge on labor income and keeping a low 
corporate tax rate.  Base-broadening of subject to income tax from around 
one half at present toward an OECD average of more than 80 percent and 
raising the value-added  tax (VAT), which is 10 percent, far below the OECD 
average of 18 percent, are suggested.  Using the VAT to raise revenue while 
relying on the earned income tax credit, which was introduced in 2008, and 
well-targeted social spending to achieve income distribution goals would be 
the best approach (OECD, 2012b).  Environmental taxes and raising the 
property-holding taxes are other options to raise revenue.   
In terms of the Gender Inequality Index, Korea ranked 11 out of 146 
countries in 2011.  However, according to the Global Gender Gap Index of 
the WEF, Korea ranked 108 out of 135 countries in 2011.  Women’s labor 
force participation rate is low, and most of the working women are 
concentrated in low-paying service sector as non-regular workers.  Gender 
gap in median earnings of full-time employees is highest among the OECD 
countries, and discrimination against women in hiring and promotion (glass 
ceiling) exists even though an equal employment law has been enacted since 
1987.  Gender inequality is multidimensional.  It is inter-related with labor 
market dualism and employment structure, cultural background, human 
capacity, welfare system including child care and health, education, law and 
institutions, and many others.  Despite the obvious gains Korean women 
have made in education, labor force participation, and access to formal 
power, discrimination against women persists today.        
 
3.1.3. Human capital 
Health and education are themselves directly related to people’s well-
being.  In addition, they build the human capital that boosts productivity 
growth.  Korean health status has improved greatly during the past 5 decades.   
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Most health indicators including mortality rate, life expectancy rate, and total 
expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP have increased.  Korea’s life 
expectancy is 71 years, ranking 30
th
 in the world in 2011. 
However, Korea’s health risk factors such as alcohol liters (14.8) and 
smoking percentage (male –53.3) show higher risks, ranking 7th and 15th 
respectively in 2010.  As a major cause of death, stomach cancer (21.36 per 
100,000 populations), liver cancer (19.52), and suicide (20.05) are high 
compared to other nations, with the country ranking 10th, 10th, and 13th in 
the world respectively.
16)
  Thus, Korea should work further to reduce those 
risks of health and causes of death.  Improving the physical health as well the 
mental health of the population should be addressed by the government 
through increasing its expenditure on various mental treatment programs 
including addiction to drugs, games, and the Internet.   
Korea has achieved a high level of education which contributed to its rapid 
economic growth and to its relatively equitable income distribution.  The 
economic growth promoted social progress, creating a virtuous circle of 
rising living standards for an increasingly healthy and well-educated labor 
force, thus favoring further education increases.  However, overemphasis on 
tertiary education and its mismatch between education and employment, low 
government support for early childhood education and care (ECEC), and 
high dependence on private out-of-school education are major issues to be 
handled. 
OECD (2012b) suggests the following: (i) improve the quality of 
vocational education, thereby helping to resolve the issue of overemphasis on 
tertiary education and mismatch problems that limit the labor participation 
rate for young workers.  (ii) upgrade the quality of tertiary education by 
ensuring adequate accreditation procedures, enhancing transparency, and 
promoting internationalization.  (iii) enhance the contribution of higher 
education to innovation by promoting links with government and business 
research institutes and increasing the share of government R&D funding that 
is allocated competitively.  (iv) expand the investment in ECEC to achieve 
                                                     
16) www.worldlifeexpectancy.com, 2012-12-20. 
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the objective of free education for children aged three to five and upgrade its 
quality, in part by mandatory accreditation and by relaxing fee ceilings on 
private childcare centers.  Indeed, outlays per student in kindergarten were 
only 37 percent of that in primary and secondary schools, well below the 
OECD average of 70 percent.   After-school study and care programs should 
be also expanded to reduce the burden of private education expenditure 
among households.   
 
3.1.4. Social protection 
Korea’s social spending is low and is not well-targeted albeit it has been 
increasing at the fastest rate in the OECD area since 1997.  Elekdag (2012) 
suggests that social spending can promote sustainable longer-term growth in 
Korea by focusing on three related challenges: (i) increasing labor market 
participation against the backdrop of rapidly aging population, (ii) reducing 
duality in the labor market, and (iii) boosting productivity in the service 
sector. 
The basic livelihood security program (BLSP) benefits are provided to 
only 3 percent of the population, which should be expanded to include more 
low-income households.  Relaxing the eligibility conditions for the BLSP is a 
priority.  There are about 4.3 million next-above low-income households 
which earn less than 1.2 times of the minimum standard of living.  The 
earned income tax credit (EITC) is another important tool for low-income 
working people but only 8.1 percent of the targeted 7.4 million workers 
received the EITC, and the average payment was relatively small.   The goal 
should be to extend the EITC to include a large share of low-income workers. 
The limited scale of pension provision and social welfare for elderly 
explain why nearly one-half of the elderly live in relative poverty, the highest 
proportion among OECD countries.  Considering that 37.5 percent of the 
elderly are in absolute poverty with income below the minimum cost of 
living (Bae, 2011), a larger benefit that is more targeted at low-income 
elderly would be more effective in reducing poverty.  Both replacement rate 
and participation rate in national pension scheme (NPS) are low compared to 
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OECD area.  But the pension amount is expected to increase fast by rapid 
population aging.  Therefore, contributions have to be increased to finance 
even this low replacement rate with the gradual raising of the pension 
eligibility age from its current level of 60.  Measures to increase compliance 
with the NPS and to enhance transparency about income are needed.  NPS 
should be supplemented by greater private savings for retirement including 
company pension schemes.  To further accelerate the transition to company 
pensions, the government should remove tax preferences for retirement 
allowances (OECD, 2012b).  
National Health Insurance (NHI)’s weak coverage of medical treatments 
and high out-of-pocket payments of patients are inequitable and regressive. 
Ceilings on co-payments were introduced and revised to take of patients’ 
ability pay while co-payments were still high.  It is important to ensure that 
ceilings on patient copayments are low enough and NHI’s coverage of 
treatments are wide enough to provide adequate access to care for low-
income households and those with chronic health problems.  Korea also 
needs to increase the efficiency of its health care system to offset the 
intensifying spending pressure (OECD, 2012b).    
Labor market dualism creates serious equity problems as a significant 
portion of the labor force works in precarious jobs at relatively low wages 
and with less protection from social insurance.  Reducing dualism requires 
weakening the incentives that firms provide to hire non-regular workers.  
One priority is to relax employment protection for regular workers.  A 
second priority is to increase the coverage of non-regular workers by the 
social safety net, thus reducing the gap in labor costs.  Finally, training 
opportunities for non-regular workers should be expanded to enhance their 
employment prospects (OECD, 2012b).   
According to the social protection index (SPI) study of the ADB (Baulch 
et al., 2008), Korea achieved the second highest value of SPI (1.03) next to 
Japan (1.55) in Asia with an overall coverage level of 77 percent of key 
target groups.  Korea’s target group coverage is relatively low in social 
assistance (58%), disabled (73%), children (52%), and microcredit (0.0%) 
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area.  This implies that more target-oriented social protection programs are 
needed.  Korea’s HDI index ranks 15 out of 187 countries in 2011, but 
inequalities in income and education area should be ameliorated.  
 
3.2. Microfinance Programs 
 
Finance matters for inclusive growth because it determines the realization 
of the economic opportunities of individuals and firms.   There is a consensus 
that financial development plays a pivotal role in facilitating economic 
growth.  Financial development can reduce poverty through economic 
growth indirectly and the poor and disadvantaged are benefiting directly from 
accessing financial services. 
Inclusive financial systems allow broad access to the poor and 
disadvantaged to finance services without price or non-price barriers.   
Financial access enables them to save and borrow for building assets, invest 
in education and business, and thus improve their livelihood.  There is a 
strong correlation between inequality in the use of formal accounts and 
general income inequality. 
In Korea, the bottom 40 percent income group has a relatively lower 
percentage (89.3%) of an account at a formal institution compared to total 
adults, and the share of those who borrow from family and friends is 17 
percent which is higher compared to G7 countries.  Korea faces 
bipolarization in financial access between high credit rating groups (1-5) and 
low credit rating groups (6-10).  Around 1.96 million people are estimated to 
have difficulty accessing loans from financial institutions.  Therefore, Korea 
has introduced microcredit programs for low-income/low credit ratings 
individuals, which are also important for social protection.  
The role of microcredit in Korea is different from developing countries. 
The microcredit programs aim to contribute to the expansion of financial 
access opportunities and rehabilitation of livelihood for the low-income/low-
credit rating individuals including the self-employed.  The impact of Korea’s 
microcredit programs could be analyzed in terms of  business results (profit, 
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income), asset creation, empowering human capacity (entrepreneurship, 
human capital, women), repayment rates, delinquency rate or reimbursement 
rate, saving and consumption, change of living attitudes (work hour, trust), 
and social participation in the supply side.  
 There are risks for moral hazard of borrowers in Korea’s microcredit 
programs.  How to solve the moral hazard problem is one of the key issues in 
microcredit programs in Korea. Korea has a long tradition of community 
cooperative compacts called ‘Kye’ for various purposes such as pooling 
capital and lending it to members in rotation.  There have been several 
systems with a similar role as microfinance institutions such as community 
credit cooperatives and credit unions in Korea but they exhibit several 
different features compared to the microcredit programs.  They are not 
exclusive for the low-income households.  However, the cooperative spirit of 
the previous community-based systems should be adopted and encouraged in 
the current microcredit programs.  In addition, individual customer tailored 
microcredit products should be guided, and clients must be managed with 
various incentive systems and flexibility, education for entrepreneurship, and 
risk management system including just execution of rule of law to prevent 
moral hazard problem.  As incentives for faithful clients, interest rate favor, 
flexibility of repayment within a certain range, matching fund for asset 
accumulation, and compensation for education are some examples.   
Some effects of microfinance can lead to deterioration in the situation of a 
segment of poor people.  Three effects can contribute to an increase in 
disparities: over-indebtedness, excessive attention paid to micro-
entrepreneurship, and the financing of high loan amounts using the savings of 
the poor.  Participation in the programs as microfinance providers, 
supporters, and volunteers is important not only for the success of the 
program but also for social capital formation and social cohesion. 
Participation of people is itself a process of inclusive growth. 
An access to finance is not the only constraint that microenterprises and 
SMEs face.  Other constraints, such as access to market, access to know-how 
and technologies, and other market failures, are included.  An ADB study 
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(2009) on SME argues that (i) access to finance is often only one of the 
major constraints to the growth of these enterprises, and other constraints 
include weak access to new technologies and dynamic markets; (ii) if SMEs 
were to increase productivity and employment, they must innovate by 
adopting new technology and diversifying into new markets; and (iii) 
government should assist SMEs, and such assistance should include 
providing information services on technology and markets, vocational 
training, and technical support services, and fostering linkages between 
SMEs and large enterprises, in addition to facilitating access to finance; that 
is, following an integrated approach or ‘credit plus approach’. 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Korea has achieved rapid economic growth and social development in the 
last 5 decades and has evolved from a poor agrarian country to one of the 
world’s industrialized high-income countries.  Korea also has achieved 
political democratization as well as a certain degree of ‘shared growth’ until 
the late 1990s.   However, Korea currently faces two fundamental challenges: 
First, Korea has to sustain economic growth in the face of rapid population 
aging and lowering potential growth rate.  Second, Korea has to achieve 
social cohesion by ameliorating income inequality and economic 
bipolarization, and by strengthening social protection. 
To respond to these challenges, this paper suggests inclusive growth as 
Korea’s new economic growth strategy.  It covers the following: (i) the 
creation of efficient productive economic opportunities, ensuring broad 
access to process and outcomes (benefits) equitably, (ii) the reduction of 
income inequality and economic bipolarization, (iii) the improvement of 
human capacities especially in health and education, and (iv) the 
strengthening of social protection.  Each of these are complements and 
functions as a factor of virtuous circle for a prosperous and harmonious 
society in Korea.  
Policy Implications for Inclusive Growth in the Republic of Korea 647 
Economic growth itself does not necessarily reduce inequality and 
bipolarization.  Flexible labor market is not a mantra for full-employment. 
Thus, government’s active income policies are needed through wage 
determinations, taxes, and subsidies. Social spending can promote 
sustainable longer-term growth in Korea by focusing on the following areas: 
(i) increasing labor market participation especially for women and youth by 
improving working environments, (ii) reducing duality in the labor market by 
improving the status of non-regular workers and self-employed business 
owners, and (iii) boosting productivity in the service sectors.  Social 
spending can increase labor force participation, human capacity, social 
cohesion, and domestic demand.   
Around 76 percent of total employment is concentrated in the service 
sector, and most of the SMES are in the service sector.  Productive 
employment creation is most related to the service sector and SMEs.   
Therefore, boosting productivity in the service sector is important for job 
creation and reducing economic inequality.  Enhancing competition and 
business environments in key service sectors are essential.  Design and 
Meeting, Incentive Tourism, Convention, and Exhibition (MICE) industries 
should be developed as new areas of service sector in Korea. 
  Rebalancing income distribution should be one of the leading policy 
objectives for Korea.  Higher wages and lower inequalities can stimulate 
demand and output growth with attendant effects on employment creation 
and productivity gains.  The minimum wage and EITC schemes should be 
improved.   Social safety nets including BLSP and old age pension program 
should be strengthened.   
Financial development matters for economic growth and poverty 
reductions.  However, Korea faces bipolarization in financial access, and 
around 2 million people are estimated to face difficulties in financial access.  
Korea has introduced microcredit programs for low-income/low credit 
ratings individuals.  Korea’s microcredit programs have such characteristics 
as individual base lending, no personal guarantee or collateral, low interest 
rates, and relatively large amount of loan.  Korea’s microfinance programs 
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should be improved and should reduce the risk of moral hazard. 
In sum, Korea needs an inclusive growth strategy for sustainable 
development with social equity and trust.  It will create a virtuous circle of 
economic growth and social cohesion as well as increasing aggregate demand 
and supply.  However, inclusive growth policies should be pursued in 
avoiding the risks of moral hazard and disparity.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
ADB, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2009, Asian Development 
Bank, Manila, 2009. 
____________, Social Protection Strategy, Asian Development Bank, 
Manila, 2011. 
____________, Framework of Inclusive Growth Indicators 2012: Key 
Indicators for Asia and the Pacific, Asian Development Bank, 
Manila, 2012. 
Addison, T. and Miguel Nino-Zarazua, “What is Inclusive Growth?,” 
Nordic-Baltic MDB Meeting, Helsinki, Finland, UNU-WIDER, 2012. 
Ali, I. and J. Zhuang, “Inclusive Growth toward a Prosperous Asia: Policy 
Implications,” ERD Working Paper Series, No. 97, Economic and 
Research Department, Asian Development Bank, 2007. 
Bae, J., “Korean National Pensions: Facts and Functions in 2009,” in Y. Kim, 
G. Széll, eds., Economic Crisis and Social Integration, Vol. 1, 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang,  2011.  
Baulch, B., Axel Weber, and Joe Wood, Social Protection Index for 
Committed Poverty Reduction, Vol. 2, Asia, Asia Development Bank, 
Manila, 2008. 
Deininger, K. and Lyn Squire, “A New Data Set Measuring Income 
Equality,” World Bank Economic Review, 10(3), 1996, pp. 565-592. 
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay, “Growth is Good for the Poor,” Journal of 
Economic Growth, 7(3), 2002, pp. 195-225. 
Policy Implications for Inclusive Growth in the Republic of Korea 649 
Elekdag, S., “Social Spending in Korea: Can it Foster Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth?,” IMF Working Paper, WP/12/250, IMF, 2012. 
European Commission Communication, EUROPE 2020: A Strategy for 
Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, 2010 (http://www.euro-
peanpaymentcounsil.eu/knowledge_bank_detail.Cfm?documents_id=
476). 
Ianchovichina, Elina and Susanna Lundstrom, “Inclusive Growth Analytics: 
Framework and  Application,” Policy Research Working Paper, 4851, 
World Bank, 2009a.  
____________, “What is Inclusive Growth?,” PRMED Knowledge Briefs, 
World Bank, 2009b. 
Kanbur, R. and Ganesh Rauniyar, “Inclusive Development: Two Papers on 
Conceptualization, Application and the ADB Perspective,” Journal of 
the Asia Pacific Economy, 15(4), 2010, pp. 436-460. 
Keum, Jaeho and Insill Yi, “What Do We Know about Non-regular Workers 
in Korea?,” Korea and World Economy, 14(2), 2013, pp. 381-415. 
Kim, Sun-Bin, “Alleviating the Three ‘Highs’ of the Self-employed,” Korea 
Economic Trend, Nov. 12, 2012, Samsung Economic Research 
Institute (SERI), 2012. 
 Klasen, Stephan, “Measuring and Monitoring Inclusive Growth: Multiple 
Definitions, Open Questions, and Some Constructive Proposals,” 
ADB Sustainable Development Working Paper Series, No. 12, Asian 
Development Bank, 2010.  
Kwon, Soon-won, “National Profile of Poverty,” in Amit K. Bhattacharyya et 
al., eds., Combating Poverty: The Korean Experience, Seoul: United 
Nations Development Programme, 1998. 
Lee, Soonho, “Korean System of Supporting for the Poor,” Sustainable 
Growth of Social and Micro Finance in Changing Times, 2011. 4. 28, 
Seminar Presentation, Korea Institute of Finance.  
Lopez, H. and L. Serven, “The Mechanics of Growth-Poverty-Inequality 
Relationship,” mimeo, World Bank, 2004. 
McKinley, T., “Inclusive Growth Criteria and Indicators: An Inclusive 
Young Youn Lee  Sophia Seung-yoon Lee 650 
Growth Index for Diagnosis of Country Progress,” ADB Sustainable 
Development Working Paper Series, 14, Asia Development Bank, 
2010. 
Nicoletti, G. and S. Scarpetta, “Regulation and Economic Performance: 
Product Market Reforms and Productivity in the OECD,” OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper, No. 460, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005. 
OECD, A Framework for Growth and Social Cohesion in Korea, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011. 
____________, OECD Employment Outlook 2012, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2012a. 
____________, OECD Economic Surveys Korea, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2012b. 
Park, Donghyun and Kwanho Shin, “The Service Sector in Asia: Is it an 
Engine of Growth?,” Working Paper, 12-21, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, 2012. 
Ravallion, M., “Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Average,” 
World Development, 29(11), 2001, pp. 1803-1815. 
Roemer, J. E., “Economic Development as Opportunity Equalization,” 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, No. 1583, Yale University, 
2006. 
Shin, Changmock, “Causes of the Decline in Korea’s Long-term Growth 
Trend: Expenditures,” Monthly Focus, No. 2012-6, Samsung 
Economic Research Institute, 2012. 
UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, 
United Nations  Conference on Trade and Development, 2012a. 
____________, Trade and Development Report 2012 — Policies for 
Inclusive and Balanced Growth (UNCTAD/GDS/2012/1), 2012b. 
UNDP, “Concept Note,” International Workshop — Inclusive Growth: What 
is it and What Does it Take?, 8-10 December 2010, International 
Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 2010 (www.ipc-undp.org). 
World Bank, “Republic of Korea: Four Decades of Equitable Growth,” 
Policy Implications for Inclusive Growth in the Republic of Korea 651 
Scaling Up Poverty Reduction: A Global Learning Process and 
Conference, Shanghai, May 25-27, 2004. 
World Economic Forum (WEF), The Global Gender Gap Report 2012, 2012. 
Zhuang, Juzhong, “Inclusive Growth toward a Harmonious Society in the 
People’s Republic of China: Policy Implications,” Asian Development 
Review, 25(1-2), Asian Development Bank, 2008, pp. 22-33.  
 
 
